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Re: Submission to Global Environmental Change 
 
 We are pleased to share a revised manuscript that addresses minor edits from two reviewers. 
We are grateful for their further refinements. We have attached a separate detailed response to 
reviewers. 
 
For a long time it has been recognized that conservation actions that disproportionately 
impact the disenfranchised few –termed environmental injustice in the resource management 
literature – are both morally wrong and less likely to achieve ultimate desired outcomes. The 
interest in these topics has recently grown dramatically with the heightened attention given to global 
inequity across many aspects of society, including wealth distribution, climate change impacts, and 
others. What has been missing from this research and debate is a more complete assessment of how 
equity in general, across the entire spectrum of equity that ranges from severe injustice to perfect 
equity, affects the probability of success in achieving the desired environmental management 
outcome. 
 
Here we tackle this issue within the realm of conservation science by developing and 
evaluating a formal conceptual foundation for assessing social equity. In particular, we highlight 
several key lessons and guidelines about how best to address the issue of equity in conservation 
planning: 
 
 Equity is an increasingly important issue to address in conservation, yet a poorly 
articulated concept in most of the literature. We developed a conceptual foundation 
for understanding and evaluating equity within conservation that will help make this 
science and its application much more rigorous. 
 In most cases there is a tradeoff between achieving conservation outcomes and 
producing equitable solutions – sometimes a strong tradeoff. We offer a formal way 
of calculating and addressing this tradeoff. 
 Triple-bottom line solutions – those that achieve conservation outcomes effectively, 
efficiently, and equitably – may be quite rare.Acknowledging (and further testing) 
this result could profoundly change the nature of conservation actions. 
 
 Formal evaluation of equity in conservation has only just begun. Our work poses as many 
questions as it tries to resolve. We anticipate it serving a foundational role in guiding future 
research addressing this globally important management topic.  
 
If additional information is needed, please do not hesitate to contact me.  
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Abstract 4 
Conservation actions generally benefit some groups more than others, and this inequity is 5 
thought to affect the probability of achieving conservation objectives. This has led to the 6 
common assumption that triple bottom line solutions -- those that are effective, efficient, and 7 
equitable -- are best and most likely to achieve each individual objective. Although this may be 8 
true, it has been little tested, and importantly lacks a conceptual foundation for understanding, 9 
predicting and evaluating how equity affects conservation outcomes. We describe types of equity 10 
relevant to conservation and explore how they may affect the probability of successfully 11 
achieving conservation outcomes. Depending on the equity type and context, the relationship 12 
between equity and conservation success varies. We find that the best conservation outcome is 13 
often achieved without perfect equity; highlighting the risk of ignoring the relationship between 14 
equity and success. We offer a conceptual foundation for better addressing this important issue in 15 
future research and application. 16 
Keywords 17 
Biodiversity, benefits, conservation planning, costs, environment, equity, triple bottom line 18 
19 
 3 
1 Introduction 20 
Social equity - the equitable distribution of costs or benefits between individuals or groups of 21 
people - is a highly sought after ideal in many aspects of society.  Whether related to education, 22 
employment, or healthcare, equitable outcomes or opportunities can influence the creation, 23 
durability, and success of local, national, and international policies (Solar and Irwin 2007).  The 24 
conservation of biodiversity is no exception (Halpern et al. 2013).  In contrast to health and 25 
education, however, relatively little work has been done to understand how, and in what cases, 26 
explicit consideration of equity influences effectiveness of a conservation plan or policy 27 
(henceforth ‘conservation intervention’, which can include, but is not limited to: protected area 28 
plans/policies, payments for ecosystem services plans/policies, etc.).  Here we aim to enhance 29 
our understanding of the relationship between different types of social equity and success in 30 
biodiversity conservation interventions, with the goal of improving conservation outcomes. A 31 
rich body of literature exists on measuring the effectiveness of conservation interventions, and 32 
understanding factors affecting the probability of their success (Bottrill and Pressey 2012; 33 
Ferraro and Hanauer 2014; Mascia et al. 2014). Success in conservation is broadly defined by 34 
achievement of stated goals, which vary according to different values and beliefs.  For example, 35 
a successful protected area plan could be measured by ecological representation, biodiversity 36 
persistence, or economic impact (Parrish et al. 2003; Klein et al. 2010), whereas a successful 37 
conservation policy could be measured by improved strength of legislation governing the use of 38 
natural resources (Gleason et al. 2010) or community support (Russ and Alcala 1999).  Other 39 
conservation outcomes might be measured by changes in social, institutional or human capital 40 
(Bottrill and Pressey 2012; Ban et al. 2013).  Ultimately, the success of conservation 41 
interventions is often evaluated on the basis of conservation benefit, social equity, and economic 42 
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return, the three components to triple bottom line conservation outcomes (Halpern et al. 2013). 43 
Yet the feasibility of achieving such triple bottom line solutions, and the potential interactions 44 
and tradeoffs among the three components, remains largely untested. Halpern et al. (2013) found 45 
that social equity can compromise achieving efficient conservation outcomes, but highlighted the 46 
importance of further research focused on exploring how the relationship between social equity 47 
and conservation success might influence these trade-offs, in particular with respect to the many 48 
different types of equity.  Here, we explore this relationship to provide insight to outstanding 49 
questions in conservation, including: Is probability of conservation success actually optimized 50 
when all three components are maximized? Or, does conservation success require approaches 51 
that deviate from the triple bottom line? 52 
Equity is increasingly recognized as a component of conservation success (Ban et al. 2013; 53 
Campese et al. 2009).  However, there are multiple types of equity (Figure 1), and being clear 54 
about what type of equity is important and being measured is critical for understanding the 55 
relationship between conservation success and equity. Equity concerns can arise from both 56 
internal factors (e.g., composition of the project team), which tend to be within the control of the 57 
planning team, and external contextual factors (e.g., social, geographic or economic conditions 58 
of the planning region), which are generally beyond the control of the project.  For example, the 59 
design of a stakeholder engagement strategy might consider equal participation of different 60 
groups in a consultation process designed to ensure representation from all affected stakeholders, 61 
an internal factor. Alternatively, the variation and spatial distribution of existing income levels in 62 
the planning region might determine which populations or communities are affected by 63 
restrictions on resource use recommended by a conservation plan, an external contextual factor. 64 
While external factors can rarely be controlled, understanding, anticipating and managing their 65 
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influence on the design and implementation of a conservation intervention is likely to increase its 66 
probability of success (Berkes 2004; Solar and Irwin 2007).  Internal factors can be inputs into, 67 
and/or outcomes of, a conservation intervention, and can influence its success (Figure 1). We 68 
believe that consideration of different types of equity improves the chance of achieving 69 
conservation success. 70 
The focus of this manuscript is on how social equity, one of many potential conservation 71 
objectives and factors affecting conservation success, influences the probability a conservation 72 
intervention succeeds in meeting its stated goal. We acknowledge that cases exist where equity 73 
plays little to no role in conservation interventions and their success, for example when 74 
governments impose protected areas despite local protests (Brockington 2004), but our emphasis 75 
here is on cases where equity matters. We identify different types of input and outcome equity 76 
and discuss their possible relationships with conservation success. Finally, we simulate how 77 
understanding these relationships can help us evaluate the feasibility of triple bottom line 78 
solutions, where social equity, environmental benefit, and economic return are maximized.  79 
2 Social equity in conservation 80 
A complex collection of social structures, economic systems, and policy frameworks determine 81 
the relevance of equity to conservation outcomes, and thus conservation success.  These social 82 
determinants of conservation equity reflect the distribution of wealth, power, and access to 83 
resources within a society, and can in turn have different consequences for different types of 84 
conservation equity. We identified many types of conservation equity, and divided them into two 85 
main categories, input and outcome, that influence conservation success (Figure 1), all of which 86 
can be influenced by socioeconomic and political context (described below in section 2.1).   87 
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Several types of equity can be either input or outcome equity, or both, depending on the decision 88 
process and goals of the conservation action. The primary distinction is whether the type of 89 
equity is a dimension of the social context that influences the process of making a conservation 90 
decision, i.e., input equity, or is something affected by the conservation action, i.e., outcome 91 
equity. As such, potential metrics of these types of equity are often the same (Fig. 1b), but how 92 
they are used and interpreted will differ. Differences between input and outcome equity are 93 
further explained and illustrated below. 94 
2.1 Socioeconomic and political context  95 
Context variables encompass a broad set of structural, cultural, and functional aspects of a social 96 
system that exert a powerful formative influence on patterns of social stratification and, thus, 97 
influence conservation equity (Ostrom 1990; Solar and Irwin 2007).  Fully characterizing all 98 
components of context is beyond the scope of this paper. Context determinants are often beyond 99 
the control of a conservation intervention, representing external factors influencing conservation 100 
success, except when the goal of the intervention is to change existing governance structures or 101 
policies. We highlight context here because it influences equity and thus affects conservation 102 
success.  Examples of determinants related to context affecting conservation success include 103 
governance, cultural and societal values, and social/economic/public policies (Figure 1).  104 
2.2 Input Equity 105 
The socioeconomic and political context within a planning region gives rise to different forms of 106 
social position and hierarchy within groups of individuals.  Populations can be stratified by 107 
socioeconomic position according to education, occupation, gender/age, race/ethnicity, 108 
 7 
generational, financial status and other factors (Figure 1).  In some cases, these different groups 109 
participate in the conservation intervention through a participatory process, and help guide 110 
decisions about what and where to protect; we classify this as a form of input equity.  For 111 
example, a decision process that includes only men or only wealthy people would be inequitable 112 
for those two types of input equity, and this may ultimately affect the ability to achieve the 113 
conservation outcome. In particular, the existence and equitability of the participatory process 114 
can directly influence conservation success by slowing or stopping the decision process, where in 115 
extreme cases the lack of a participatory process is responsible for failure of the intervention 116 
(Gleason et al. 2010). In other cases, the participatory process can influence the outcome of the 117 
intervention (e.g., the size or location or regulations of a protected area plan), which can in turn 118 
indirectly influence conservation success.  119 
2.3 Outcome Equity 120 
Outcome equity refers to the distribution of costs and benefits of the final outcome of the 121 
conservation intervention (e.g., a protected area plan) to different socio-economic groups and/or 122 
across space (Figure 1). For example, a protected area plan can disproportionately impact 123 
different socioeconomic groups, such as different industry sectors (Adams et al. 2010; 124 
occupation equity), by restricting access to a natural resource (access or spatial equity). In many 125 
cases input equity can influence outcome equity, as those involved in the decision process may 126 
design a conservation intervention that favors themselves and thus leads to outcome inequity, 127 
often for the same type of equity (e.g., if men dominate the decision process, they may produce 128 
outcomes that produce greater benefits for men). Outcome equity can be independent of input 129 
equity when conservation interventions do not involve a participatory process.   130 
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3 Equity and probability of conservation success 131 
Once the types of equity relevant to a conservation intervention have been identified, 132 
conservation success requires understanding how these types of equity affect the probability of 133 
success. Increased social equity is often assumed to improve the probability of conservation 134 
success (Brown 2002; Halpern et al. 2013).  In some cases, this assumption may be true; for 135 
example, in the implementation of locally managed marine areas, where self enforcement of new 136 
regulations is more likely to occur when local people perceive the regulations as equitable 137 
(Hatcher et al. 2000). However, it is also likely that conservation will fail if vocal or powerful 138 
individuals or groups are not satisfied with the outcome, in other words, if the outcomes of 139 
conservation planning and actions do not match the (often inequitable) local context. The 140 
relationship between equity and probability of conservation success is presumed to be positive 141 
(Brown 2002) yet is poorly understood, and further complicated when values and perceptions 142 
among and between different groups are taken into account too (Ravallion 2014; Figure 2). 143 
Recognizing the difference between absolute, relative and perceived is critical for objective 144 
setting and evaluation of intervention outcomes. Absolute equity refers to every participant 145 
experiencing the same, or equal, outcome. For example, regardless of size, every boat is allowed 146 
to catch the same number of fish (Figure 2). Relative equity refers to participants experiencing a 147 
proportional outcome related to a stated variable, e.g., boats receiving fish catch in proportion to 148 
their boat size as compared to other boats. Perceived equity is how those involved in the process 149 
perceive of their allotted outcome compared others, e.g., the size of fish catch relative to other 150 
fishers.  151 
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Here, we describe four general relationships that have been observed between equity and 152 
probability of conservation success (P(x); Figure 3): A) Linear, where P(x) increases 153 
proportionally with increasing equity; B) Asymptotic, where P(x) increases rapidly with initial 154 
increases in equity and then plateaus; C) Humped, where P(x) rises initially and then drops off 155 
with higher levels of equity, and D) Sigmoidal, where P(x) responds slowly at first to increases 156 
in equity and then rises quickly.  For nonlinear shapes, the location of inflection points (i.e., 157 
change in slope) is likely connected to a contextual determinant, such as governance or cultural 158 
value. For each relationship, we describe it in the terms of individual types of equity and support 159 
it using empirical evidence, where possible. These four relationships are hypotheses; their 160 
frequency of occurrence and impact on overall conservation outcomes are still to be fully tested. 161 
We hope the conceptual foundation described here helps make such testing more rigorous.  For 162 
any equity type, its relationship with conservation success will likely vary from case to case 163 
depending on how equity is considered in the process (as an input or an outcome), how equity is 164 
measured (as quantitative or qualitative values, e.g., dollars versus participation effort), and how 165 
equity is defined (as absolute, relative or perceived) (McClanahan et al. 2008) (Figure 2). 166 
3.1. Linear 167 
Occupational and spatial equity are two of several types of equity that may relate linearly with 168 
conservation success (Figure 3a).  For example, it seems reasonable to expect conservation plans 169 
that produce more equitable relative impact to each key occupational sector, would be more 170 
successful.  In California, the Marine Life Protection Act Initiative is an example of a successful 171 
conservation plan that made considerable effort to equitably impact commercial fishery sectors 172 
in each major region (Klein et al. 2010; White et al. 2013).  173 
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With spatial equity, a linear relationship between equity and conservation success has been 174 
observed with a type of spatial fisheries management, Territorial User Rights in Fisheries 175 
(TURFs), which allow individuals or a set group of people to fish in a particular area. TURFs 176 
have demonstrated increasingly positive outcomes with increasing levels of both input and 177 
output equity. For example, Chilean TURF cooperatives allocate effort temporally and spatially 178 
via a pooling scheme (input equity), to equalize the work burden and spread effort in a more 179 
efficient manner (Cancino et al. 2007), and this program has successfully met conservation goals 180 
(by not exceeding the total allowable catch) and social goals (by equally distributing the 181 
transaction costs  and benefits of the TURF) – an example of output equity. 182 
3.2 Asymptotic 183 
Financial and participation equity are two of several types of equity that could relate to 184 
conservation success asymptotically (Figure 3b), where conservation success increases with 185 
increasing levels of equity to a point, after which equity does not influence success. With 186 
financial equity, conservation success is assumed to increase with increasing financial equity 187 
(i.e., distribution between groups regardless of financial status or profitability). However, in 188 
some cases conservation success is likely to peak, and remain constant, when more powerful or 189 
vocal stakeholders receive the greatest benefit.  For example, when the Great Barrier Reef was 190 
rezoned, the government provided monetary compensation to commercial fishermen but not to 191 
other, more profitable industries (Macintosh et al. 2010).  As fishermen were the most vocal 192 
stakeholder group, allocation of additional money to other groups, an example of output equity, 193 
may not have impacted conservation success, resulting in an asymptotic relationship.  194 
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Similarly to financial equity, the probability of success of conservation interventions could 195 
increase, to a point, with increasing participation from stakeholder groups (participation equity). 196 
An example of how stakeholder participation can lead to successful conservation was 197 
demonstrated using data from 84 forest management cases around the world (Persha et al. 2011); 198 
whereas, lack of stakeholder participation lead to an unsuccessful conservation was shown in the 199 
first attempt to implement the California’s Marine Life Protection Act (Gleason et al. 2010).  200 
Similarly, in Alaska where all federal fisheries are managed by annual catch limits and some 201 
type of limited access program, stakeholders and the public have several opportunities for 202 
participation input during the development phase, which is recognized as critical for building 203 
stakeholder acceptance of the program and balancing divergent interests (Fina 2011). However, 204 
this relationship is unlikely to be linear, as conservation success likely stabilizes once the most 205 
vocal or influential stakeholders are included in the process (i.e., engaging additional, less 206 
influential stakeholders in the decision process might increase equity but likely have little effect 207 
on conservation success).  208 
3.3 Humped  209 
Generational, gender, social, ethnicity, and financial (described above) are types of equity that 210 
could affect conservation success in a humped fashion, where the peak of the hump reflects the 211 
point in which conservation success is maximized. For example, some conservation initiatives 212 
favor current generations and disproportionately impose costs on future generations, indicating a 213 
humped shaped relationship that peaks early to reflect the bias towards current generations 214 
(Figure 3c) (Dobbs 1982). Generational equity would be difficult to achieve as a type of input 215 
equity given timeframes involved in most decision processes. In many societies, conservation 216 
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success is generally assumed to increase linearly with increased gender equity inputs and outputs 217 
(Agarwal 2009; Figure 3a).  However, conservation success probably peaks at a point that 218 
matches the power structure of a society. In many places, decisions are often made by, or favor, a 219 
single gender (Martin and Lemon 2001; Agarwal 2009; Tsikata and Golah 2010), thus 220 
conservation success would peak at the point that reflects this power structure. Other types of 221 
equity, in particular social class and ethnicity, often reflect different power and influence among 222 
groups within regions.  In community forestry programs in Nepal, while socially dominant 223 
(higher caste) individuals make management decisions affecting all groups, lower caste social 224 
classes harvest a majority of the forest resources, and therefore conservation success is unlikely 225 
to occur until they are involved, even if at a minimal level. Yet, higher caste groups might not 226 
tolerate a substantial redistribution of decision-making rights among other social classes 227 
reflecting a humped relationship (Nightingale 2002).  228 
3.4 Sigmoidal  229 
Types of equity that potentially have an asymptotic relationship to conservation success would 230 
exhibit a sigmoidal relationship in cases where some minimum threshold level of equity exists 231 
that is needed to achieve success.  For example, in fisheries management based on individual 232 
transferable quotas, each fisher (or fisher group) is allowed a ‘catch share’ (i.e., access equity) 233 
that can be used, sold, or leased.  This form of regulation is only likely to be successful if some 234 
minimum threshold of output equity is achieved, or in other words, fishermen are not entirely 235 
excluded from the process.  If access equity increases, more people are given access to a smaller 236 
portion of the fishery, assuming a total allowable catch has been set and remains constant, and 237 
thus individual catch would decrease. In this case, probability of success likely plateaus at some 238 
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intermediate level of equity (sigmoidal relationship).  For example, the halibut and sablefish 239 
fisheries have historically supported a large number of small vessels (Fina 2011). Both set 240 
individual fishing quotas (IQFs) to reflect historic fisheries access, but entry into the fishery is 241 
limited. Thus, probability of success increases to a point where enough of the fishers buy into the 242 
program, but probably plateaus at a point where entry (access equity) is limited and total 243 
allowable catch and catch shares remain steady.  244 
3.5. Additional aspects of the curves 245 
Some types of equity may express different relationship curves depending on the context. For 246 
example, with the catch allocation example in section 3.4, if individuals become less satisfied 247 
with their shrinking allocation of catch with increasing equity, they may begin violating 248 
regulations, in turn decreasing conservation success at higher levels of equity (humped shape 249 
curve instead of sigmoidal). Similarly, the relationship between financial equity and conservation 250 
success may be humped if groups without much power or voice receive money that could have 251 
gone to groups that feel they deserve more, causing those groups to perceive the allocation as 252 
inequitable and unacceptable for success. 253 
A key unknown about any of the potential relationships between equity and conservation success 254 
is where the curve crosses an axis (Fig. 1a, inset). It is often assumed that conservation 255 
interventions will fail without some minimum level of equity (Borrini et al. 2004), such that the 256 
curves would intersect the x-axis at some value greater than zero. Yet there are other examples 257 
where conservation has been successful despite highly inequitable outcomes, for example where 258 
top-down management displaces local communities (Brockington 2004, de Santo et al. 2011). In 259 
these cases, the curves would intersect the y-axis at a value greater than zero. 260 
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Additionally, different types of equity, each with its own curve, may be relevant and important 261 
within the same management plan.  Such differences further challenge incorporating equity into 262 
conservation planning, but can be resolved at least partially by efforts to elicit the relative 263 
importance of each type of equity to stakeholder groups and then incorporate those weights into 264 
formal multi-criteria decision making (Kittinger et al. 2014). 265 
 266 
4 Discussion 267 
We need a better understanding of the relationship between equity and conservation success, 268 
including when and how much social equity contributes to conservation success, to achieve 269 
conservation goals.  We provide a conceptual foundation for understanding how and when 270 
different types of equity can influence conservation success relative to how equity is measured 271 
and perceived. Understanding the nature of these interactions between equity, conservation 272 
success, and economic return is fundamental for determining the feasibility of triple bottom line 273 
solutions.  In conservation planning, expected conservation benefit is typically calculated as the 274 
product of probability of success and conservation benefit. In general, conservation benefit 275 
reflects both biodiversity conservation and economic efficiency objectives, addressing two 276 
pillars of the triple bottom line (Halpern et al. 2013). Here we demonstrate, in theory, how a 277 
third pillar, equity, potentially affects probability of conservation success (shown in Figure 3), 278 
and how this in turn interacts with the way equity can limit potential conservation benefits 279 
(Figure 4). The implication of these results is that equity can either exacerbate (Fig. 4b-d) or 280 
mitigate (Fig. 4a) the ability to achieve biodiversity and economic conservation objectives. In 281 
most cases, the optimal conservation outcome is achieved without perfect equity. In fact, high 282 
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levels of equity could severely compromise conservation outcomes (e.g. Figure 4c) if, for 283 
example, existing power structures are themselves inequitable, which highlights the risk of not 284 
considering the relationship between equity and probability of success.  285 
 286 
We simplified the problem by considering each type of equity separately, but acknowledge that 287 
complex relationships exist among specific types of equity and between context determinants 288 
(Adelman and Morris 1973), and that these interactions influence the degree of success. Further, 289 
we acknowledge that additional relationships are likely to exist (e.g., nonlinear shapes with 290 
multiple inflection points, flat lines where equity has no bearing on conservation success), and 291 
that the relationships may change through time, as people learn and adapt, and among 292 
communities that have different contexts.  Similarly, different groups within a planning process 293 
may value different types of equity, and if those types influence the process (input equity) or 294 
respond differently to the conservation intervention (outcome equity), then overall conservation 295 
success could be compromised. A more indepth understanding of these relationships and 296 
interactions is important and will require empirical research focused on determining or 297 
evaluating specific relationships between the probability of success and equity, as well as how 298 
different types of equity are valued by stakeholders within a planning process (i.e., how much 299 
weight to give each one in planning decisions).  Embarking on this substantial research agenda 300 
requires a conceptual foundation, which is the crux of this manuscript.  301 
 302 
Complicating matters further, the actual relationship between equity and conservation success 303 
may differ from the perceived relationship of equity for different individuals or groups (Webb et 304 
al. 2004; McClanahan et al. 2008).  Perceptions of equity and conservation success reflect the 305 
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values of those involved in, or affected by, a program or strategy, their expectations, and whether 306 
goals are achieved (Axford et al. 2008).  Perceptions are important as they lead people to change 307 
their behavior (e.g., whether or not to comply to new regulations) and/or lead to new 308 
conservation actions (Claus et al. 2010). As with absolute equity, perceptions of equity will 309 
likely change through time and vary among individuals and communities, creating an additional 310 
challenge for understanding the relationship between equity and conservation success. Not all 311 
perceived values of conservation (associated with either costs or benefits) will be tangible or 312 
easily quantifiable; yet assessing their relative importance has merit. Any type of equity in 313 
principle could be measured subjectively on a unitless scale of low to high. Formalization of 314 
problems that involve values can be an anathema to some, but the benefits of explicating 315 
integrating these issues into formal conservation planning are greater than ignoring perceived 316 
values altogether.    317 
 318 
Social equity in conservation has emerged from concern for environmental justice and fairness, 319 
in particularly, for those groups most affected by conservation interventions or most dependent 320 
on natural resources for their livelihoods. These issues reflect two important key ethical 321 
considerations. The first, which has been the primary focus of this paper, relates to how social 322 
equity among and between different groups might be represented in the process or outcomes of 323 
conservation planning. The second relates more specifically to how different types of equity are 324 
defined, by whom and for which groups. Goals reflect the values and beliefs of those individuals 325 
or groups that set them. We have suggested several key types of equity, but these are by no 326 
means exhaustive or prescriptive. Rather we provide a conceptual basis for articulating types of 327 
equity, the possible relationships between equity and conservation outcomes, and ways to 328 
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interpret trade-offs among types of equity and between equity and conservation outcomes. Such 329 
a framework has the potential to inform and support rights-based approaches to conservation.  It 330 
would be nearly impossible to consider all types of equity at once, thus conservation planners 331 
have to make some decision as to which types of equity to consider. Similar decisions are made 332 
when considering economic and ecological objectives, e.g., which actions to take to conserve 333 
which species (Bottrill et al., 2008). How these decisions are made will depend on the local 334 
context in which the conservation intervention occurs, but we recommend an explicit conceptual 335 
framework to promote transparency and balance different perspectives.  336 
 337 
Our conceptual foundation provides a lens through which issues of equity and conservation 338 
success can be viewed and studied using empirical data.  This foundation informs further 339 
research required to resolve outstanding issues, including: 1) empirical evidence to document 340 
and measure the frequency of occurrence and effect of different types of social equity on the 341 
probability of conservation success; 2) information on whether minimum thresholds of equity are 342 
required to achieve conservation success (Figure 3a); 3) data on the contribution of equity versus 343 
other factors in affecting conservation success among different interventions, and potential 344 
tradeoffs among these factors; 4) a systematic review to synthesize existing evidence on which 345 
types of interventions, and their relative conservation success, are most influenced by which 346 
types of social equity; and 5) definitions and perceptions of conservation success among and 347 
across different groups and contexts. Greater knowledge of these issues will improve our 348 
understanding of how and when to consider equity in conservation decisions making.   349 
 350 
Multiple objectives are common in conservation, yet there is not always consensus on objectives 351 
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among individuals and groups.  Conservation planning can only strive to achieve the stated 352 
objectives and ensure that the objectives are clear, measurable and identified through a 353 
transparent and participatory process with multiple stakeholders. Governments and organizations 354 
are increasingly moving away from purely biophysical approaches to biodiversity conservation 355 
to more holistic approaches based on sustainable human interactions, which require integration 356 
of environmental, social, and economic demands.  Although substantial work has been done to 357 
promote the need for addressing social factors in effective planning design and implementation 358 
(Ban et al. 2013), there has been little focus on social equity and its influence on conservation 359 
outcomes, despite the assumption that triple bottom line solutions are commonly held as ideal.  360 
We hope our work here will help improve conservation success by shedding light on how and 361 
why equity influences the probability of success, the consequences of not adequately considering 362 
equity on conservation outcomes, and provide guidance on tradeoffs among social equity, 363 
economic efficiency, and conservation effectiveness for conservation interventions.  364 
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Figure Legends 458 
Figure 1. (a) Conservation success can be influenced by several different types of equity 459 
(described in b), both as an input into (e.g., participation by stakeholder groups) and/or an 460 
outcome of the conservation intervention (e.g., access to natural resources by individuals or 461 
groups). Each type of equity can be influenced by a variety of socioeconomic and political 462 
context determinants.  463 
 464 
 Figure 2. Equity influences conservation success in different ways, depending on how it is 465 
measured and perceived. Potential measures and perceptions are illustrated for access equity, 466 
where a management plan limits fishing access to different fisher groups (each with a different 467 
size boat).  When measured in absolute terms (a), each group benefits equally, represented by 468 
catching the same number of fish; when measured in relative terms (b), the benefit is distributed 469 
proportionally to the size of the boat.  (c) the group with the largest boat has a positive 470 
perception of the relative benefits, whereas groups with smaller boats have a negative 471 
perception.   472 
 473 
Figure 3. Four broad classes of relationship between equity and the probability of conservation 474 
success, P(x) : (a) Linear; (b) Asymptotic; (c) Humped; and (d) Sigmoidal. A value of 1 indicates 475 
perfect equity and conservation success.  For each relationship, we do not know where they cross 476 
an axis (shown in (a)). If there is a minimum threshold of equity, below which there is zero 477 
chance of success, then the lines would cross the x-axis; whereas if success is possible in 478 
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inequitable situations, the lines would intercept the y-axis. Photos represent equity types that can 479 
exhibit the associated relationship, occupational, participation, gender, and access, respectively. 480 
Photos courtesy of (a) Urlich Karlowski; (b) World Wildlife Fund, Inc. Tory Read; (c) Trond 481 
Larsen; (d) Cristina Mittermeier. 482 
Figure 4. The relationship between equity and conservation benefit (i.e., success), and how 483 
different relationships between probability of success (P(x), from Fig. 3), given different levels 484 
of equity modifies the ability of the conservation intervention to achieve biodiversity 485 
conservation outcomes.  The solid gray line shows a general possible trade-off between 486 
conservation benefit and equity (taken from Halpern et al. 2013). The dashed gray lines show 487 
four possible relationships between equity and probability of success, described in Figure 3.  The 488 
solid black lines are the resulting consequence of these probability relationships on the degree to 489 
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